Jacksonville State University

JSU Digital Commons
Research, Publications & Creative Work

Faculty Scholarship & Creative Work

2018

Partisan conflict, policy uncertainty and aggregate corporate cash
holdings
Chak Hung Jack Cheng
University of South Carolina

Ching Wai (Jeremy) Chiu
Bank of England

William B. Hankins
Jacksonville State University, whankins@jsu.edu

Anna Leigh Stone
Samford University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.jsu.edu/fac_res
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Other Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Cheng, C.H.J., Chiu, C.W.J., Hankins, W.B. & Stone, A.L. (2018) "Partisan conflict, policy uncertainty and
aggregate corporate cash holdings," Journal of Macroeconomics, 58(C), 78-90.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship & Creative Work at JSU Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research, Publications & Creative Work by an authorized
administrator of JSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@jsu.edu.

Journal of Macroeconomics 58 (2018) 78–90

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Macroeconomics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jmacro

Partisan conﬂict, policy uncertainty and aggregate corporate cash
holdings☆

T

⁎

Chak Hung Jack Cheng ,a, Ching-Wai (Jeremy) Chiub, William B. Hankinsc,
Anna-Leigh Stoned
a

George Dean Johnson, Jr. College of Business and Economics, University of South Carolina Upstate, 160 East St. John Street, Spartanburg, SC 29306,
USA
b
Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH, United Kingdom
c
Department of Finance, Economics, and Accounting, School of Business and Industry, Jacksonville State University, 700 Pelham Road North,
Jacksonville, AL 36265, USA
d
Department of Economics, Finance, and Quantitative Analysis, Brock School of Business, Samford University, 800 Lakeshore Drive, Birmingham, AL
35229, USA

A R T IC LE I N F O

ABS TRA CT

Keywords:
Partisan conﬂict
Cash holdings
Economic policy uncertainty
VAR
Sign restrictions
Local projections

This paper distinguishes political uncertainty from policy uncertainty shocks and uncovers new
empirical facts about how each impacts the aggregate cash holdings of US ﬁrms. Our baseline
structural vector autoregression model shows that an exogenous one standard deviation shock to
political and economic policy uncertainty is followed by 1 and 1.8% increase in aggregate corporate cash-to-total assets after ﬁve and eight quarters, respectively. The baseline result also
shows that policy uncertainty shocks tend to raise ﬁnancial market volatility while political
uncertainty shocks tend to lower ﬁnancial market volatility. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that
political uncertainty exerts asymmetric eﬀects on aggregate corporate cash holdings, with a
shock tending to raise cash holdings under normal ﬁnancial conditions and lower cash holdings
under tight ﬁnancial conditions. Our main results are robust against a wide range of shock
identiﬁcation schemes as well as against parametric and non-parametric model estimations.

JEL classiﬁcation:
G30
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E32

1. Introduction
In recent years, the role of corporate cash holdings and its implication for the US economy and business cycle ﬂuctuations has
received increasing attention in the macroeconomics literature. Adao and Silva (2016) show that the increase in ﬁrm cash holdings
after 1980 has ampliﬁed the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks. Bacchetta et al. (2016) study the relationship between the corporate
cash ratio and employment. Alfaro et al. (2016) examine how ﬁrm cash holdings could exacerbate the impact of a ﬁnancial uncertainty shock. Uncertainty is often perceived as an important driver of corporate cash holdings. In this paper, we disentangle
political uncertainty shocks, proxied by the Partisan Conﬂict (PC) Index introduced by Azzimonti (2018a), from policy uncertainty
shocks, proxied by the news-based Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index developed by Baker et al. (2016), and provide empirical
☆
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evidence that both types of uncertainty matter for aggregate corporate cash holdings in the US.
Using data on all non-ﬁnancial and non-utility ﬁrms from Compustat Quarterly File over the period 1985Q1–2008Q3, we develop
a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model that enables us to model the dynamical relationships between cash holdings, political
uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, as well as the real economy. To identify structural political uncertainty shocks from
structural economic policy uncertainty shocks, we adopt the Cholesky decomposition as our baseline identiﬁcation method, with the
variable ordering informed by previous research. Our baseline results show that an exogenous one standard deviation (10%) increase
in the PC Index is associated with an increase in the aggregate cash-to-total assets ratio that reaches a peak of 1% approximately ﬁve
quarters after the initial shock. Our results also show that a one standard deviation (20%) shock to the EPU Index causes the
aggregate cash ratio to increase by about 1.8% after eight quarters. In addition, a forecast error variance decomposition shows that
partisan conﬂict and economic policy uncertainty shocks together account for up to 18% of the variation in the cash ratio at the 16
quarter horizon. Importantly, these ﬁndings are evident even after controlling for aggregate uncertainty, proxied by the VIX index,
national ﬁnancial conditions, proxied by the Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index, and short-term aggregate ﬁnancial
constraints, proxied by the 3-month Commercial Paper-Treasury Bill Spread.
Uncertainty can aﬀect cash holdings through various channels. For example, Bloom (2009) points out that heightened uncertainty
could trigger a drop in investment by increasing the real option value of waiting, which could lead to an accumulation of cash. This
point is highlighted in Azzimonti (2011), Canes-Wrone and Park (2012) and, Azzimonti (2018b). Moreover, by increasing the risk of
default, an increase in uncertainty may raise ﬁnancial frictions as ﬁrms tend to hold more cash as the cost of external ﬁnancing rises.
This is consistent with the precautionary motive. Political and policy uncertainty are particularly relevant to the cash holding
behavior of ﬁrms. In the model presented in Azzimonti (2018b), partisan conﬂict could cause the probability in which risk-averse
investors believe costly rare events would happen to rise. This could lower expected return and lead to delays in investment decisions,
resulting in an increase in cash holdings. In addition, if ﬁrms perceive heightened economic policy uncertainty to be long-lasting, they
may question the extent of available proﬁtable investment in the future. A preference for cash in the face of uncertainty over future
investment is consistent with the model discussed in Almeida et al. (2011).
Our baseline model shows that an economic policy uncertainty shock lowers investment and raises ﬁnancial market volatility. On the
other hand, a partisan conﬂict shock leads to a brief fall in investment and, interestingly, a decline in both ﬁnancial market volatility and
economic policy uncertainty. This latter result is in line with several ﬁndings, both theoretical and empirical, from the literature on
political and policy uncertainty. For example, Pastor and Veronesi (2012) demonstrate theoretically that low policy uncertainty leads to
low ﬁnancial market volatility. In another theoretical exercise, Bechtel and Füss (2008) show that divided government can lower policy
risk by reducing the likelihood of any policy changes and conﬁrm their hypothesis using German data. More recently, Azzimonti (2018b)
argues that high levels of partisan conﬂict may potentially lower economic policy uncertainty. Lower economic policy uncertainty can
occur if the policy status-quo remains unchanged as a result of gridlock amongst politicians. Finally, these ﬁndings are consistent with
Gupta et al. (2018b), who show that a rise in US partisan conﬂict lowers stock market volatility.
We also discover signiﬁcant asymmetric responses of cash holdings to uncertainty shocks. Particularly, we highlight that a
partisan conﬂict shock exerts a signiﬁcant impact on investment and output under tight ﬁnancial conditions, which is also observed
for EPU shocks. On the other hand, when a partisan conﬂict shock occurs during a ﬁnancially tight period, ﬁnancial market volatility
falls and ﬁnancial conditions actually loosen, resulting in a 5% decline in the aggregate cash ratio within the ﬁrst two quarters.
However, this asymmetry does not present itself following an EPU shock, where we observe increases in the aggregate cash ratio of
5% by approximately the ﬁfth quarter. Thus, we highlight an important diﬀerence between how a political uncertainty shock and an
economic policy uncertainty shock impact the cash management decisions of US ﬁrms. Our main results are robust against a range of
shock identiﬁcation schemes as well as against parametric and non-parametric model estimations.
Overall, this paper is among the ﬁrst to concurrently identify structural shocks to political uncertainty and economic policy
uncertainty and their implications for corporate cash holdings and the broader macroeconomy. These ﬁndings also contribute to a
nascent, but growing literature examining the broader consequences of US partisan conﬂict (see for example Azzimonti, 2018a;
Azzimonti, 2018b; Cheng et al., 2016; Gupta et al., 2018a; Gupta et al., 2018b). Finally, this paper complements the ﬁndings of
Alfaro et al. (2016) who show, among other results, that a rise in ﬁnancial uncertainty raises corporate cash holdings. In the next
section, we will discuss how our paper ﬁts into the relevant literature on this topic.
2. Related literature
Adopting a macro-econometric methodology, this paper adds to an extensive empirical literature investigating the relationship
between diﬀerent types of uncertainty and the cash holdings practices of ﬁrms. The literature examining corporate cash holdings has
experienced tremendous growth since the inﬂuential study by Opler et al. (1999). As documented by Bates et al. (2009), since 1980,
corporate managers have increased cash holdings for precautionary reasons. The precautionary motive has been discussed at least as
far back as Keynes (1936). Other important contributions studying the precautionary motive include (Opler et al., 1999; Almeida
et al., 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007). Through our study of cash holdings over the period 1985–2008, our paper adds to this literature on
the precautionary motive of corporate cash holdings.
In particular, our paper contributes to the investigation of how systematic uncertainty impacts corporate cash holdings.1 Baum
1
By using the word “systematic” we are referring to a class of uncertainty that aﬀects all ﬁrms. This is in contrast to idiosyncratic uncertainty,
which would be used to describe ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty.
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et al. (2006, 2008) were concerned with how macroeconomic uncertainty impacted corporate cash management decisions. In the
former, the authors showed that heightened macroeconomic uncertainty led to a reduction in the dispersion of cash-to-total assets,
including for ﬁrms that were ﬁnancially constrained and ﬁrms deemed high growth. In the latter, the authors studied the cash-to-total
assets of manufacturing ﬁrms and found that cash holdings increased in response to macroeconomic uncertainty. Gao and
Grinstein (2014) study a larger set of ﬁrms and ﬁnd that aggregate level uncertainty, as opposed to idiosyncratic uncertainty, has a
more pronounced eﬀect on the cash holdings decisions of ﬁrms. More recently, Graham and Leary (2017) show that macroeconomic
factors, rather than ﬁrm-level factors, are more important for explaining the evolution of aggregate cash holdings in the US. Our
contribution to this literature is that we disentangle two important sources of systematic uncertainty: policy uncertainty and political
uncertainty. Furthermore, we will provide evidence that periods of political uncertainty can be distinct from policy uncertainty and
aggregate uncertainty more generally.
Julio and Yook (2012) estimate how corporate investment and cash holdings practices behave during election periods. They ﬁnd
evidence that corporate managers increase cash holdings and decrease investment, both as a percentage of total assets, during
election years. These results give us reason to expect an increase in corporate cash holdings during periods associated with political
uncertainty. However, by using the PC Index and the EPU Index, we can not only distinguish between two types of uncertainties, as
discussed above, but observe political uncertainty for all available years.
Our paper is perhaps most closely related to Alfaro et al. (2016). Their paper builds a partial equilibrium model to show that
higher uncertainty not only induces the negative real-options impact on the demand for labor and capital, but also leads ﬁrms to
hoard cash and cut debt to hedge against future shocks. In particular, they argue that ﬁnancial frictions roughly double the negative
impact of uncertainty shocks on investment and hiring. Using ﬁrm-level data regressions, they ﬁnd evidence that higher ﬁnancial
uncertainty is associated with larger cash holdings. Motivated by these results, we will study the response of corporate cash holdings
and other macroeconomic variables to political and policy uncertainty shocks during periods of high and low ﬁnancial frictions.
In addition, this paper is related to a strand of the macroeconomics literature that uses the working capital channel to motivate
how ﬁrms hold cash. The earliest work in this area dates back to Christiano (1991), Fuerst (1992), and Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992).2 Speciﬁcally, this channel is based on the assumption that ﬁrms’ variable inputs such as labor and capital must
be ﬁnanced by short-term loans, also known as the cash-in-advance constraint. Monetary policy can exert an eﬀect on the real
economy because any changes in the interest rate will change ﬁrms’ variable production costs, on top of the usual demand mechanism. This paper is also related to Bacchetta et al. (2016), who show a systematic negative co-movement between employment
and the corporate cash-to-total assets ratio.
3. Motivation
Given the potential similarities between the various proxies for uncertainty that are available to economists today, it is important to
distinguish political uncertainty from policy uncertainty, and aggregate uncertainty more generally. In this section, we will brieﬂy motivate
our research question by highlighting theoretical and empirical diﬀerences between the various uncertainty proxies used in this paper.
Azzimonti (2018a) points out that political uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty are fundamentally diﬀerent. There are
two types of policy-related uncertainty. The ﬁrst type represents uncertainty about the types of policies the government might adopt
whereas the second type relates to uncertainty over the eﬀects of policies that have already been adopted. Azzimonti (2018a) points
out that political uncertainty is only related to uncertainty over what policies would be chosen. Pastor and Veronesi (2012) also
distinguish between political uncertainty and impact uncertainty. Theoretically, they model political uncertainty as the standard
deviation of the political costs associated with the potential implementation of a new policy and model impact uncertainty as the
standard deviation of the impact on the average proﬁtability of ﬁrms. In their model, political uncertainty and impact uncertainty are
captured by diﬀerent structural parameters. They show that both types of uncertainty can impact ﬁrms’ behaviors in important ways.
As mentioned in Section 1, we use the Partisan Conﬂict (PC) Index introduced by Azzimonti (2018a) to measure political uncertainty and the news-based Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index developed by Baker et al. (2016) to measure the degree of
policy uncertainty in the US.
The Partisan Conﬂict Index is created using a multi-staged word search procedure that is described in Azzimonti (2018a).
Azzimonti (2018a) performs a monthly search of major English-language US newspapers and counts the number of articles mentioning words
associated with both government and political disagreement. For example, words that might be used to describe government include
“Congress,” “Republican,” and “Democrat,” while words used to describe political disagreement include “gridlock” and “ﬁlibuster”
(Azzimonti, 2017, p. 6). The index is reﬁned using a number of procedures meant to reduce the incidence of false-positives.3
The Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is also created using a newspaper search procedure. Speciﬁcally, the authors conduct a
monthly search of ten major U.S. newspapers and count articles mentioning, in the words of the authors the following trio of terms:
‘uncertainty’ or ‘uncertain’; ‘economic’ or ‘economy’; and one more of ‘Congress’, ‘deﬁcit’, ‘Federal Reserve’, ‘legislation’, ‘regulation’,
or ‘White House’ (ibid: p. 1594).4
Despite some similarities, there are important diﬀerences between these indices. First, Azzimonti (2018a) searches over a word
2

Christiano et al. (2010) provide a detailed survey.
See Azzimonti (2017, 2018b, 2018a) for a more detailed discussion of how the Partisan Conﬂict Index is created, including the full list of search
terms.
4
See Baker et al. (2016) for a detailed list of these news sources.
3
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list devoted to disagreement between politicians. For example, the PC Index will count articles discussing disagreement between
legislators, parties, or legislators and the president, regardless of the source of disagreement. Conversely, the EPU Index will only
count an article discussing political disagreement if that disagreement is about uncertainty regarding the economy. In short, the PC
Index is a much broader measure of political dysfunction. Furthermore, uncertainty over Federal Reserve policy will not register on
the PC Index whereas it will register on the EPU Index.
Second, the PC and EPU indices do not necessarily co-move. As Azzimonti points out, a relatively high level of partisan conﬂict can be
associated with a low level of economic policy uncertainty because observers might reason that the government is in such a state of
dysfunction that no meaningful policy will be generated. Conversely, there are periods where economic policy uncertainty is exceptionally
high while the PC Index is at a relatively low level. This can be observed in Fig. 1. For example, in the third quarter of 2001, when the US
suﬀered the September 11th terrorist attack, EPU increases to an extremely high level. However, the PC Index decreases, indicating what
Azzimonti referred to as a “rally around the ﬂag” eﬀect (Azzimonti, 2017, p. 3). Furthermore, as shown in Table 1 the unconditional
correlation between the PC and news-based EPU indices over our sample period is 0.0033. Not only does the PC Index reveal periods of
uncertainty that do not register on the EPU Index, and vice versa, but the PC Index is also distinct from the VIX index, a broader measure of
aggregate ﬁnancial market uncertainty. Again, looking to Fig. 1, we see that the PC Index and VIX often move in opposite directions and pick
up diﬀerent types of uncertainties. The raw correlation between PC and VIX is −0.21. On the other hand, the EPU Index and VIX are closely
related, displaying similar trends and registering heightened uncertainty during the same historical events.
Preliminary evidence for the impact that political and economic policy uncertainty can have on the corporate cash ratio is
provided in Table 2, which shows the dynamic correlations between the cyclical components of the PC Index, the EPU Index, and the
aggregate corporate cash ratio between 1985Q1 and 2008Q3. Following the business cycle literature, we detrend the series using the
HP ﬁlter with the ﬁltering parameter set at 1600. We see signiﬁcant positive correlations between the corporate cash ratio and lags of
the PC Index, with a peak correlation of 0.26 at a four-quarter lag. Interestingly, lags of the EPU Index display positive correlations
(0.37 at the eighth lag) before turning signiﬁcantly negative at the one-quarter lag. Table 2 provides preliminary evidence that there
are signiﬁcant business cycle relationships between the two types of uncertainty and the aggregate corporate cash ratio. We will now
proceed to a description of the baseline empirical model.
4. The vector auto-regression model
The eﬀects of uncertainty shocks on the US economy are estimated through our baseline vector auto-regression (VAR) model. We
consider the following model:

B (L) yt = d + et

(1)

where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, d is a vector of constant terms and et are the reduced-form residuals, fulﬁlling E(et ) = 0
and E(et e′t ) = Σ. B(L) is given by = I + B1 L + B2 L2 + ...+BN LN , where N is the lag length of the VAR model.
The following variables are included in the VAR model: the Partisan Conﬂict Index (PCt), the news-based Economic Policy
Uncertainty Index (EPUt), the volatility index (VIXt), the Adjusted National Financial Condition Index (ANFCIt), real gross domestic
product (GDPt), real investment (Invt), the aggregate corporate cash ratio (Casht), the federal funds rate (FFRt), and the commercial
paper spread (Spreadt). More speciﬁcally, the vector yt reads as follows:

yt = [PCt , EPUt , VIXt , ANFCIt , GDPt , Invt , Casht , FFRt , Spreadt ] ′
All variables are in log values, except for the Adjusted National Financial Condition Index, the federal funds rate, and the
commercial paper spread. We employ quarterly data from 1985Q1 to 2008Q3 in our estimation. The sample starting date is based on
the availability of the EPU Index. The end data is chosen to help avoid the potential structural shift in the PC Index and any nonlinearities that might be caused by the ﬁnancial crisis after 2008.5
We use data from Compustat Quarterly File to construct measures of aggregate cash holdings. Compustat provides ﬁnancial
information on all publicly-traded corporations in the United States by corporate observation. Aggregate cash holdings is the aggregate of cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments. To compute the aggregate cash-to-asset ratio, we divide aggregate
corporate cash holdings by aggregate total assets for each quarter.6 Financial ﬁrms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are
excluded because the former hold cash related to their unique business practices while the latter hold cash primarily for regulatory
purposes. In addition, we exclude ﬁrms headquartered outside of the United States.
The Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is taken from the “Economic Policy Uncertainty” website and the Partisan Conﬂict Index
is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.7 To be consistent with the construction of the PC Index, we use the newsbased EPU Index in our baseline model.
5
We stop our estimation at 2008Q3, as suggested by Nodari (2014), in order to avoid the zero lower bound period, which could potentially bias
estimates of the reaction of the federal funds rate to partisan conﬂict and economic policy uncertainty. We provide a robustness check using a longer
sample in the appendix.
6
Cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments include non-interest earning assets, low-interest earnings assets, and interest-bearing assets
as long as they are short-term.
7
The Economic Policy Uncertainty website is http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ The Partisan Conﬂict Index is available at https://www.
philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/partisan-conﬂict-index.
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Fig. 1. PC, EPU, and VIX: 1985–2008. Notes: This chart shows the Partisan Conﬂict Index (PCI), Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), and VIX.
PCI is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, EPU is taken from www.policyuncertainty.com, and VIX is constructed according to
Bloom (2009). PCI and EPU are measured by the vertical axis on the left hand side and VIX is measured by the vertical axis on the right hand side. All
series are measured at a quarterly frequency. Historical events correspond to major PC and EPU shocks identiﬁed in Section 7.

To control for aggregate ﬁnancial uncertainty, we follow Acharya et al. (2013) in adopting the VIX index in our baseline model.8,9
To control for ﬁnancial conditions, we follow Alessandri and Mumtaz (2017) and adopt the National Financial Conditions Index
(NFCI), constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The NFCI is a broad representation of US aggregate ﬁnancial conditions.
It is computed as a factor from a large set of variables that relate to the money, debt, and equity markets and the leverage of ﬁnancial
intermediaries. In particular, we use the Adjusted National Financial Condition Index (ANFCI). Unlike the NFCI, the ANFCI is isolated
from economic conditions and it is only aﬀected by ﬁnancial conditions. To control for short-term aggregate ﬁnancial constraints, we
follow Acharya et al. (2013) by constructing the commercial paper spread, which is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between 3-month
commercial paper and treasury yields. Data for the other variables in the model are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (FRED) database.
The summary statistics for the indices used in this paper are reported in Table 3.
The VAR model is estimated with two lags as suggested by Akaike information criterion, however, our results are robust to various
lag selections. We adopt a standard Cholesky (recursiveness) decomposition approach to identify the structural shocks and impose
recursive restrictions on the model residuals. In particular, we follow Bloom (2009) and Caggiano et al. (2014) by ordering the EPU
Index before the macroeconomic variables. Azzimonti (2018a) points out that heightened political uncertainty can potentially lead to
higher economic policy uncertainty.10 Thus, we order the PC Index ﬁrst and before the EPU Index, implying that PC shocks exert
8
Since VIX is unavailable prior to 1986, we follow Bloom (2009) and use the actual monthly return volatilities, which are computed by monthly
standard deviation of the daily S&P 500 index normalized to the same mean and variance as the implied volatility index when they overlap in 1986.
9
We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
10
In addition to this variable ordering, in Section 5.3.1 we describe an alternative VAR speciﬁcation with the PC Index ordered after the EPU
Index.
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Table 1
Correlation matrix among uncertainty and ﬁnancial market indices.

PC
EPU
VIX
ANFCI
CP Spread

PC

EPU

VIX

ANFCI

CP Spread

1.0000
0.0033
−0.2101
−0.0630
0.1229

1.0000
0.6027
0.1020
0.0169

1.0000
0.5063
0.4248

1.0000
0.8791

1.0000

Note: “PC” denotes the Partisan Conﬂict Index; “EPU” denotes the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index; “VIX” stands for the volatility index; “ANFCI”
denotes the Adjusted National Financial Condition Index; “CP spread” denotes the 3-month Commercial Paper-Treasury Bill spread. The sample is
between 1985Q1 and 2008Q3.
Table 2
Dynamic correlations between uncertainty and aggregate cash holdings.
j(Quarterly lag/lead)
−8

−6

−4

−2

−1

0

4

corr(PC t + j, Casht)

0.02

0.19

0.26

0.25

0.14

0.14

−0.05

corr(EPU t + j, Casht)

[−0.11,0.14]
0.37

[0.07,0.31]
0.40

[0.17,0.35]
0.27

[0.17,0.34]
0.03

[0.25,0.50]

[0.29,0.51]

[0.19,0.35]

[−0.05,0.11]

[0.03,0.24]
−0.13
[− 0.21, −0.04]

[0.01,0.27]
−0.22
[− 0.33, −0.11]

[−0.23,0.12]
−0.34
[− 0.65, −0.03]

Note: All quarterly series are expressed in logarithm and HP-ﬁltered with the ﬁltering parameter set at 1600, following the practice of the business
cycle literature. Numbers in square bracket correspond to 80% conﬁdence interval estimated with the Newey-West estimator. The sample is between
1985Q1 and 2008Q3.
Table 3
Summary statistics for uncertainty and ﬁnancial market indices.

PC
EPU
VIX
ANFCI
CP Spread

Mean

Median

Max.

Min.

Std. Dev.

92.84
99.91
19.78
−0.24
0.48

90.98
94.20
19.32
−0.39
0.42

123.79
190.67
49.81
1.37
1.69

67.90
52.09
11.03
−1.06
0.07

12.45
28.24
6.35
0.52
0.30

Note: “PC” denotes the Partisan Conﬂict Index; “EPU” denotes the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index; “VIX” stands for the volatility index; “ANFCI”
denotes the Adjusted National Financial Condition Index; “CP spread” denotes the 3-month Commercial Paper-Treasury Bill spread. The sample is
between 1985Q1 and 2008Q3.

contemporaneous eﬀects on all other variables in the model. The “fast moving” ﬁnancial variables, such as the VIX index and the
commercial paper spread, are ordered after both the PC and EPU indices. This implies that ﬁnancial variables respond to PC and EPU
shocks within the same quarter. In the next section we will discuss the results from the baseline model. In Section 5.3.1, we provide
robustness checks for our results to diﬀerent orderings of the model variables.
5. Baseline results
5.1. Impulse responses
Fig. 2displays the estimated impulse responses to an unanticipated 10% rise in the PC Index (referred to as a PC shock), amounting to a
one standard deviation shock. Following the suggestion of Sims and Zha (1999), we present the impulse responses along with 68%
probability bands. The model predicts that a positive shock to the PC Index leads to a short-lived decrease in private investment and an
insigniﬁcant decrease in real GDP. Moreover, it is predicted that a positive shock to the PC Index exerts a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the aggregate
cash-to-total assets ratio, which rises after the shock and reaches its peak of 1% after ﬁve quarters. One plausible reason for the delayed
response of the cash-to-total assets ratio is due to portfolio adjustment costs. Firms may not be able to immediately and costlessly adjust
how total assets are held. Interestingly, both the EPU and VIX indices drop signiﬁcantly after a partisan conﬂict shock. This result is
consistent with the ﬁndings in Gupta et al. (2018b), who show that a rise in partisan conﬂict lowers stock market volatility. Our result is
also in line with Azzimonti (2018b), who argues that high levels of partisan conﬂict may lower economic policy uncertainty as politicians
are unlikely to reach an agreement and no meaningful policy would be passed.
Fig. 3shows that an unanticipated 20% rise in the EPU Index (EPU shock), equivalent to a one standard deviation shock, leads to
signiﬁcant economic contractions; that is, investment and output fall by 1% and 0.35% , respectively, ﬁve quarters after the shock.
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses to a political uncertainty (PC) shock. Notes: Political Uncertainty is proxied by the Partisan Conﬂict Index developed in
Azzimonti (2018a). Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to Partisan Conﬂict Index. Solid lines: median responses. Grey shaded
areas: 68% probability bands.

Such a result is consistent with the ﬁndings in the literature. The short-term interest rate falls signiﬁcantly as well. In addition, the
aggregate cash ratio increases by 1.8% eight quarters after the shock, although it does lead to a short-lived fall in the cash ratio on
impact. Compared with the PC shock, an EPU shock imposes a larger and more delayed eﬀect on the cash-to-total assets ratio.
Moreover, as pointed out by Pastor and Veronesi (2012), as the impact of a policy becomes more uncertain, ﬁrms would need to learn
about the potential eﬀect of the new policy before they make any signiﬁcant changes to their business decisions. This could delay the
response of the cash ratio to an EPU shock. It is also important to point out that unlike a PC shock, an EPU shock leads to a rise in
aggregate volatility and a tightening of ﬁnancial conditions on impact.
5.2. Forecast error variance decomposition
Table 4reports the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for our variables for horizons between 2 and 32 quarters implied
by the baseline model. The table shows that PC shocks play a limited role in explaining the output variations, but EPU shocks are
more important for the short-run ﬂuctuations in the cash ratio and other real variables, explaining 14% of the variation in investment,
16% of the variation in GDP, and a little over 8% of the variation in the cash ratio at the 8 quarter horizon. Importantly, both political

Fig. 3. Impulse responses to an economic policy uncertainty (EPU) shock. Notes: Economic Policy Uncertainty is proxied by the Economic Policy
Index developed in Baker et al. (2016). Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. Solid lines:
median responses. Grey shaded areas: 68% probability bands.
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Table 4
Forecast error variance decomposition.
Panel A: share of variation in all variables explained by structural PC shock
GDPt
ePC

Invt
ePC

Casht
ePC

FFRt
ePC

Spreadt
ePC

2
94.04
1.25
1.36
0.05
8
85.33
4.56
4.28
0.23
16
78.06
3.98
3.21
1.00
32
72.00
3.68
2.60
1.26
Panel B: share of variation in all variables explained by structural EPU shock

0.85
0.26
0.25
0.42

2.04
1.19
1.23
1.51

0.32
4.49
4.02
3.36

1.76
3.00
2.81
2.47

0.01
0.12
0.48
0.58

Horizon
(Quarters)

Horizon
(Quarters)

PCt
ePC

PCt
eEPU

EPUt
ePC

EPUt
eEPU

2
0.67
84.21
8
1.37
66.15
16
2.79
58.85
32
2.95
52.97
Panel C: share of variation in cash explained by all

VIXt
ePC

ANFCIt
ePC

VIXt
eEPU

ANFCIt
eEPU

GDPt
eEPU

Invt
eEPU

Casht
eEPU

FFRt
eEPU

Spreadt
eEPU

23.85
15.24
18.76
15.84
shocks

9.12
12.77
14.59
15.01

12.71
15.74
6.57
3.85

12.62
14.02
6.37
7.12

3.39
8.04
14.07
10.97

29.73
43.32
33.38
31.19

11.58
23.12
21.81
22.61

Horizon
(Quarters)

Casht
ePC

Casht
eEPU

Casht
eVIX

Casht
eANFCI

Casht
eGDP

Casht
eInv

Casht
eCash

Casht
eFFR

Casht
eSpread

2
8
16
32

0.32
4.49
4.02
3.36

3.39
8.04
14.07
10.97

0.25
0.09
0.13
0.34

0.44
8.96
11.06
21.43

0.04
0.10
0.75
8.02

0.44
0.52
2.27
3.27

91.97
60.75
46.78
35.02

2.29
13.90
17.64
14.24

0.86
3.15
3.28
3.35

Note: Panel A shows the forecast error variance decomposition for all variables that is explained by a PC shock. Panel B shows the forecast error
variance decomposition for all variables that is explained by an EPU shock. Panel C shows the forecast error variance decomposition for the
aggregate cash ratio that is explained by each shock. The unit is in percent.

and economic policy uncertainty shocks together explain a considerable fraction of the forecast variance in the aggregate cash ratio:
PC shocks explain 4% and EPU shocks explain 14% of variations at the 16 quarter horizon. Hence, if we consider only PC and EPU
shocks together in our baseline model, which includes the VIX index, the ANFCI, real GDP, real investment, the cash ratio, the federal
funds rate and the commercial paper spread, we ﬁnd that they explain about 18% of the variation in cash holdings.
Table 4also displays the share of variation in the aggregate cash ratio explained by diﬀerent structural shocks. The table shows that a
VIX shock plays a very limited role in explaining the variations in the cash ratio. On the other hand, shocks to the ANFCI and the federal
funds rate play a more important role in driving the cash ratio, accounting for 11 and 18% , respectively, at the 16 quarter horizon.
On the whole, the results show that both PC and EPU shocks are a non-trivial source of disturbance to the aggregate corporate
cash ratio. Our baseline results show that EPU shocks lead to a larger rise in the aggregate cash ratio and generate deeper economic
contractions when compared to PC shocks. In the next subsection, we present a battery of robustness checks and alternative shock
identiﬁcation schemes that largely uphold our baseline results.

5.3. Robustness checks to baseline results
5.3.1. Alternative model speciﬁcations
We conduct several robustness checks and re-examine the results under alternative VAR speciﬁcations. Our robustness checks
include: (i) replacing the news-based EPU Index with the “Overall EPU Index”; (ii) augmenting the baseline model with the consumer
sentiment index; (iii) augmenting the baseline model with the TED spread, a common proxy for aggregate funding liquidity; (iv)
augmenting the baseline model with the liquidity shocks uncovered by Bacchetta et al. (2016)11; (v) augmenting the baseline model
with a factor extracted from a large panel of US economic variables, arguably summarizing the overall economic conditions and
hence mitigating the problem of variable omission; (vi) estimating the baseline with four lags instead of two; (vii) ordering the PC and
EPU indices, respectively, as the last variables; (viii) re-estimating the baseline model with a longer sample ending in 2014Q4 while
accounting for the potential structural shift in the PC Index after 2008Q4 and (ix) re-estimating the baseline model with a new
deﬁnition of cash holdings that excludes short-term investments.12 Due to the large number of ﬁgures that accompany these additional tests, all of the robustness checks mentioned in this subsection are available in the appendix. It is worth noting that our main
results reported in Section 5 remain robust.
11

Both (iii) and (iv) are motivated by Bacchetta et al. (2016) and are intended to account for adverse liquidity shocks.
As discussed in Section 4, cash holdings includes short-term investments. However, a PC or EPU shock could potentially aﬀect cash holdings
through its impact on the valuation of equity. To address this concern, we construct an alternative aggregate cash-to-assets ratio that excludes shortterm investments. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
12
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5.3.2. Sign restrictions
We also attempt to relax the strict timing assumptions implied by Cholesky decomposition by imposing sign and zero restrictions on the
contemporaneous impulse response functions, based on the algorithm proposed by Arias et al. (2014). The sign restrictions approach is
attractive since it allows the identiﬁcation to remain agnostic with respect to the responses of the key variables of interest. Moreover, the
results based on the sign and zero restrictions approach are not sensitive to the ordering of the variables. Table 5 displays the restrictions
we impose. The sign restrictions are motivated by the theoretical predictions in the literature, a detailed discussion of which is found in the
appendix. However, the key feature is that we are agnostic about the response of the cash ratio to the uncertainty shocks.
The resulting impulse responses are reported in the appendix. Our baseline results remain robust: policy uncertainty shocks cause
signiﬁcant business cycle ﬂuctuations. Political and policy uncertainty shocks also cause a persistent rise in the aggregate cash ratio,
although the rise is no longer signiﬁcant.13 It is worth noting that, in response to PC shocks, both VIX and the ﬁnancial conditions
index see a persistent decrease. This is in line with our baseline results and implies that our main results are not sensitive to
alternative identiﬁcation methods.
6. Non-parametric estimation: local projection
The methodology we have implemented thus far is parametric in nature. In this section, we adopt a non-parametric impulse
response estimation approach to estimate the impacts of PC and EPU shocks. More speciﬁcally, we use the local projection (LP)
method proposed by Jordà (2005). One advantage of using local projections over VAR models is that local projections are less prone
to model misspeciﬁcation (Jordà, 2005). Moreover, unlike in a VAR setting, the estimation of reduced-form equations for all variables
is not required. An additional beneﬁt to the LP methodology is that it provides us with a convenient way to study the potential
nonlinear nature of uncertainty shocks. This will be explored in more detail in the next section.14
We ﬁrst rely on a statistical method to construct “exogenous” uncertainty shocks. Following Bloom (2009) and
Caggiano et al. (2014), we adopt a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter to identify “big spikes” in the uncertainty series. In particular, we
adopt the smoothing parameter to be λ = 1600 and isolate the large spikes of the realizations above 1 standard deviation of the HPﬁltered trend.15 Some of the major PC and EPU shocks identiﬁed by this approach are included in Fig. 1. These identiﬁed shocks are
associated with ﬁnancial crises and political events, such as wars, 9/11, and elections, which are likely driven by exogenous factors.
In the appendix, we show that these results remain robust to the use of the procedure developed by Hamilton (2018).
We then estimate the impulse response functions using local projection methods. We consider the following series of regressions:

yt + h = αh + θh νt + X t − 1 + ut + h

h≥0

(2)

where h refers to the horizon, y is the endogenous variables of interest, αh is a constant term, νt is the constructed exogenous structural
shock and ut + h is the model residual. νt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the PC (or EPU) Index is 1 standard
deviation larger than its HP-ﬁltered value, and 0 otherwise. Xt is a vector of control variables that include two lags of the following
variables: the PC Index, the EPU Index, the VIX index, the ANFCI, real gross domestic product, real investment, the aggregate
corporate cash ratio, the federal funds rate, and the commercial paper spread.16
The coeﬃcient θh represents the response of y at time t + h to an exogenous shock at time t. We use OLS to estimate a series of
regressions for each horizon and the estimated standard errors of θh are used to compute the error bands. We adopt the Newey-West
variance estimator to account for the serial correlations among the residuals.
Figs. 4and 5 report the impulse response functions — in general the responses are less smooth, as noted by Ramey and
Zubairy (2018), since local projections do not impose any restrictions among impulse responses. However, the baseline results are
mostly robust to this non-parametric estimation. Speciﬁcally, a PC shock induces a drop and quick rebound in investment and output.
This drop, rebound, and overshoot behavior in investment and output is due to an increase in the real option value of waiting, as
pointed out by Bloom (2009). A PC shock also leads to a hump-shaped rise in the aggregate cash ratio. On the other hand, the
economic contraction implied by the EPU shock is somewhat weaker under our non-parametric estimation. However, the persistent
increase in the aggregate cash ratio remains robust and statistically signiﬁcant.
7. Asymmetric responses of uncertainty shocks under diﬀerent ﬁnancial conditions
In this section, we will take advantage of the ﬂexibility aﬀorded by the non-parametric methodology from Section 6 and study
potential asymmetries in the nonlinear impact of political and economic policy uncertainty shocks, respectively. As discussed in the
13
The statistical insigniﬁcance can be explained by the substantial increase in “uncertainty” in the estimation because sign restrictions identify a
set of models rather than uniquely pinning down a single structural model, as noted by Fry and Pagan (2011) and Baumeister and Hamilton (2015).
14
In principle, we can use a nonlinear VAR – for example an interacted VAR model where the coeﬃcients are interacted with ﬁnancial regime
variables. However, we choose not to adopt this approach because it would require us to estimate signiﬁcantly more parameters with a relatively
short data sample.
15
Bloom (2009) and Caggiano et al. (2014) use the threshold value of 1.65 instead of 1 to isolate uncertainty shocks. Our results remain robust
when we use 1.65 as the threshold value.
16
We also estimate a model that controls for a wider range of corporate accounting variables that are relevant to cash holding in the corporate
ﬁnance literature. These variables, taken from Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009), include the market-to-book ratio, cash ﬂow, net working
capital ratio, leverage, and size. These results are available in the appendix.
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Table 5
Sign and zero restrictions.

Partisan conﬂict shock
Economic policy uncertainty shock

PCt

EPUt

It

VIXt

ANFCIt

GDPt

FFRt

Casht

Spreadt

+
0

?
+

–
–

?
?

?
?

?
?

?
?

?
?

?
?

Note: This table reports the sign and zero restrictions imposed on the contemporaneous impulse responses in order to identify the two structural
shocks of interest. Entries with “?” indicate that no restrictions are imposed and we are agnostic about the signs. Explanations on these restrictions
are found in the appendix.

Fig. 4. Impulse responses to a political uncertainty (PC) shock using local projections. Notes: Political uncertainty is proxied by the Partisan Conﬂict
Index developed in Azzimonti (2018a). Grey shaded areas: one standard error conﬁdence bands.

Fig. 5. Impulse responses to an economic policy uncertainty (EPU) shock using local projections. Notes: Economic Policy Uncertainty is proxied by
the Economic Policy Index developed in Baker et al. (2016). Grey shaded areas: one-standard-error conﬁdence bands.

previous section, this approach is preferable to using a nonlinear VAR, which would be computationally expensive.
As pointed out by Alfaro et al. (2016), heightened ﬁnancial uncertainty often leads to cash hoarding and this eﬀect tends to be
stronger during periods of high ﬁnancial frictions. We adopt the Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI) as a proxy for
aggregate ﬁnancial conditions. Financial conditions are deﬁned as “tight” when the ANFCI is above zero and as “loose” or “normal”
when it is equal to or below zero. We interact Eq. (2), the original linear local projections model, with this proxy:
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yt + h = It [αhT + θhT νt ] + (1 − It )[αhL + θhL νt ] + X t − 1 + ut + h

h≥0

(3)

where It is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 when the ﬁnancial condition is tight and 0 otherwise. X t − 1 includes the
interaction terms between the lagged control variables and the lagged indicator functions. The coeﬃcients θhT and θhL capture the
eﬀect of an uncertainty shock on the variable of interest under tight and loose ﬁnancial conditions, respectively.17
As in the linear local projection model, we employ data from 1985Q1 to 2008Q3. The results are reported in Figs. 6 and 7, where
we observe interesting diﬀerences between how the aggregate cash ratio responds to diﬀerent uncertainty shocks. Fig. 6 shows that
when a PC shock is felt during loose or normal ﬁnancial conditions, the aggregate cash ratio increases to a peak of approximately 3%
by the third quarter, which is qualitatively consistent with what we observed in Figs. 2 and 4. However, the increase in cash is
relatively short-lived. While several of the additional variables in the model move in the predicted directions – investment and GDP
fall – they are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Conversely, when a PC shock occurs during tight ﬁnancial conditions, we see a
starkly diﬀerent response. Following the shock, the aggregate cash ratio falls signiﬁcantly upon impact, reaching a 5% decline by the
second quarter and a 9% decline by the ﬁfth quarter. Furthermore, both the EPU Index and VIX decrease signiﬁcantly within a few
quarters while GDP and investment fall as well.
This last observation is crucial for explaining the decline in the cash ratio. The decline in policy uncertainty after a partisan
conﬂict shock is indeed supported by previous research, both theoretical and empirical. Bechtel and Füss (2008) develop a theoretical
model showing that divided government leads to a reduction in economic policy uncertainty and ﬁnancial market risk. They ﬁnd
empirical evidence for their theoretical claim using German political and economic data. More relevant to our ﬁndings, though, is the
recent work by Gupta et al. (2018b), who observed that US stock market volatility was lower in the presence of a PC shock. Given the
observed relationship between VIX and the EPU Index, it is not surprising that we also observe a decline in uncertainty over economic
policy. This result is also consistent with the theoretical model developed by Pastor and Veronesi (2012), which shows that lower
policy uncertainty leads to lower ﬁnancial market volatility. For several of the moderate-to-large spikes in the PC Index, observed in
Fig. 1, we see declines, sometimes rather sharp, in economic policy uncertainty. Hence, it is possible that when the economy is
already in a ﬁnancially tight state, a PC shock precipitates lower economic policy uncertainty and ﬁnancial market volatility, leading
ﬁnancial conditions to loosen, which could potentially relax the borrowing constraints faced by ﬁrms. As a consequence, ﬁrms choose
to reduce the percentage of assets held as cash in lieu of other uses.
Fig. 7shows the impulse response functions following an EPU shock under tight and loose ﬁnancial conditions, respectively. Not
surprisingly, an EPU shock leads to an increase in VIX under both tight and loose ﬁnancial conditions. Under loose ﬁnancial conditions, ANFCI is mostly indistinguishable from zero, except for a short-lived decrease early on. However, we also observe a large
increase in ANFCI upon the impact of an EPU shock during tight ﬁnancial conditions. During tight ﬁnancial conditions, the aggregate
cash ratio appears to increase signiﬁcantly approximately three quarters following the shock and, during loose ﬁnancial conditions,
the increase in cash begins around the ﬁfth quarter. Under both tight and loose conditions, the cash ratio reaches a peak of approximately 5% by the ﬁfth quarter. Although the median impact response of the cash ratio to an EPU shock is larger under tight
ﬁnancial conditions, the diﬀerence in the response of the cash ratio under both tight and loose ﬁnancial conditions is not statistically
signiﬁcant. The reason for why the cash ratio increases to approximately the same level under both ﬁnancial condition regimes is
likely related to the close relationship between VIX and the EPU Index during the sample period. An exogenous event that causes a
shock to economic policy uncertainty is also likely to increase ﬁnancial market volatility. Since this volatility is quite high under both
loose and tight conditions, we see the increase in cash.

8. Conclusion
In this paper, we distinguish political uncertainty from policy uncertainty and investigate the impacts of these two diﬀerent
types of uncertainty on the cash holdings of corporate ﬁrms in the US. By using various models, both parametric and nonparametric, we ﬁnd that both types of uncertainties exert a signiﬁcant impact on the aggregate cash ratio. Moreover, together,
they explain a considerable portion of the variation in the cash ratio in our sample. Our main results are upheld by a series of
robustness checks.
We also ﬁnd that the impact of political uncertainty on the aggregate cash ratio displays asymmetry. In particular, we ﬁnd
political uncertainty shocks lower economic policy uncertainty and ﬁnancial volatility signiﬁcantly under tight ﬁnancial conditions,
leading to a decline in corporate cash holdings. However, a similar response is not observed after a policy uncertainty shock. Our
empirical results add to the recent literature that relates uncertainty and corporate cash holdings, and lays the groundwork for further
theoretical investigation into their relationships in the future. Another interesting extension is to consider measures of local and state
partisan conﬂict that would help researchers measure the response of cash holdings of ﬁrms within and across states. We leave this for
future research.18

17
In the appendix, we provide robustness checks replacing the Aggregate Financial Conditions Index with two liquidity indicators, following
Bacchetta et al. (2016) and Chiu (2014). The results are broadly robust.
18
We thank an anonymous referee for this interesting suggestion.
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Fig. 6. Asymmetric impulse responses to a political uncertainty (PC) shock using local projections — ﬁnancial conditions (ANFCI). Notes: Impulse
responses to a partisan conﬂict dummy shock. Dashed lines: responses under loose ﬁnancial conditions. Lines with Diamonds: responses under tight
ﬁnancial conditions. Grey shaded areas and solid lines represent one standard error conﬁdence bands in tight and loose ﬁnancial conditions,
respectively.

Fig. 7. Asymmetric impulse responses to an economic policy uncertainty (EPU) shock using local projections — ﬁnancial conditions (ANFCI). Notes:
Impulse responses to an economic policy uncertainty dummy shock. Dashed lines: responses under loose ﬁnancial conditions. Lines with Diamonds:
responses under tight ﬁnancial conditions. Grey shaded areas and solid lines represent one standard error conﬁdence bands in tight and loose
ﬁnancial conditions, respectively.

Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.jmacro.2018.08.010 .
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